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NOTES
COMMERCIAL LAW-MAINTENANCE OF
COMPENSATING BALANCES INDICTABLE
OFFENSE UNDER 18 U.S.C.A. §656
In United States v. Mann,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of an indictment' which had charged

defendant Mann, chief executive officer of the First National Bank of
Waco, Texas, together with co-defendant Bank of the Southwest with conspiracy3 to willfully misapply the funds of Waco, through the maintenance

of a non-interest bearing compensating balance at Southwest in return for
a loan to Mann at preferential interest rates, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§656.1 The district court had dismissed the indictment for insufficiency
and the United States appealed.
The conspiracy evolved due to Mann's desire to acquire the controlling
interest of the Waco bank. By maintaining a compensating balance at
Southwest,' Mann not only received a preferential interest rate on his
loan 6 but also caused the Waco bank to forego interest money that it
otherwise would have received.

The federal statute involved in this case is quite old; the forerunner of
18 U.S.C.A. §656 was first promulgated in the late 19th century.' Using

§656, however, to attack the maintenance of compensating balances as a
1. 517 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. Id. at 262.
3. 18 U.S.C.A. §371 (Rev. 1966):
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, .... each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
4. 18 U.S.C.A. §656 (Rev. 1966):
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or employee of, or connected in any
capacity with any Federal Reserve Bank, member bank, national bank, or insured
bank, . . . embezzles, abstracts, purloins, or willfully misapplies any of the monies,
funds, or credits of such bank or any monies, funds, assets, or securities entrusted
to the custody or care of such bank, . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years or both ....
5. Mann deposited $4,000,000 of Waco's funds in a non-interest bearing account at Southwest in return for a loan from Southwest totaling $4,000,000. Mann intended to use the loan
proceeds to acquire controlling interest in Waco. 517 F.2d at 263.
6. Mann's loan from Southwest was listed at 3% per annum, notwithstanding the fact that
Southwest's prime lending rate was at 8 1/2% per annum. This lower rate resulted in a
$460,000 savings for Mann within a two year period. 517 F.2d at 263.
7. See REv. STAT. 5209, p. 1007 (1873-74). See also United States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655,
2 S.Ct. 512, 27 L.Ed. 520 (1883).
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willful misapplication of bank funds has evolved only since the promulgation of Banking Circular No. 31.8 The circular was sent to the presidents
of all the national banks. It advised them that there were no cases "at the
present time" construing the use of compensating balances to obtain a
*preferential interest rate loan to be a misapplication of bank funds under
the criminal statutes, yet some such situations might exist that would
warrant prosecutive action.
Even though the activities being attacked by the section may be relatively new, the essential elements of a substantive violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§656 have been clearly delineated.' Any indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged, fairly inform the defendants of the charge
against which they must defend, and if a second action is brought, it must
enable the defendants to plead a prior conviction or acquittal as a bar to
that second action. 0 But more specifically, for an indictment to be sufficient to allege a violation of §656, it must include an allegation: (1) that
the accused was an officer, director, etc. of a bank; (2) that the bank was
connected in some capacity with a national or federally insured bank; (3)
that the accused willfully misapplied the money, funds, etc. of said bank;
and (4) that the accused acted with intent to injure or defraud said bank."
In a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.A. §656, so long as the offense is set out
in the language of the statute, it is not necessary that the indictment set
forth the means by which the offense was committed."
Since the promulgation of Banking Circular No. 31 and prior to Mann,
there has been only one case construing the use of compensating balances
in return for loans to bank officials as a misapplication of bank funds in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §656.1 The first consideration by an appellate
court of such an application of the statute occurred in United States v.
Brookshire,'4 decided last year by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
facts of Brookshire were strikingly similar to those of the present case.
Brookshire, a bank president, in conjunction with another bank, used the
same scheme employed by Mann, (i.e., maintenance of a compensating
balance in return for a preferential interest rate loan). He was indicted
under §656 for willful misapplication of bank funds and was subsequently
8. Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 31 (Oct. 1970). See 517 F.2d at 269.
9. See Garrett v. United States, 396 F.2d 489, 491, (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
952, 89 S.Ct. 374, 21 L.Ed.2d 364 (1968).
10. 517 F.2d at 266, citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038,
1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, 250-51 (1962).
11. 517 F.2d at 267. See Garrett v. United States, 396 F.2d at 491. But see Ramirez v.
United States, 318 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1963), where the court suggested that intent to
injure or defraud need not specifically be alleged because the allegation of willful misapplication sufficiently imports an intent to injure or defraud.
12. United States v. Archambault, 441 F.2d 281, 283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
843, 92 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed.2d 78 (1971).
13. United States-v. Brookshire, 514 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975).
14. Id.
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convicted. The court found little merit in the defendant's contention that
"willfully misapplies" is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain.' 5 Also,
since the indictment was set out in the language of the statute, the court
had no trouble disposing with an attack on its sufficiency."' The defendant
claimed a denial of equal protection in that he was wrongfully being singled out to test government theories as to the scope of §656. The court
found that this statute did not invidiously discriminate as that considered
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'7 nor was selective enforcement, in itself, a federal
constitutional violation.'" The indictment did not create a new offense
through the use of the words "willfully misapplies,"'9 nor was it an attempt
to regulate private business through the use of a criminal prosecution. 0
United States v. Insco ' provided little comfort to the defendant due to the
fact that the record contained no proof of any open and constant practice
by bankers to secure favors through the use of compensating balances. In
Ins6o the court reversed the conviction of an unsuccessful candidate for
federal office for failing to place an attribution clause on bumper stickers
distributed by him, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §612. Three factors led the
court to this decision: (1) silence in the legislative history of the statute
made it unclear whether Congress intended to encompass bumper stickers
in the attribution clause requirement; (2) there had been a "universal
practice" among candidates of not affixing such clauses to bumper stickers; and (3) the case was the first prosecution ever brought by the justice
department. The court felt that Insco had been "lulled into the reasonable
impression" that his actions were not criminal. Overall, the court in
Brookshire concluded: that the indictment was sufficient; that the jury
found the necessary intent to convict; and that the defendant had willfully
misapplied the funds of his bank in order to obtain a personal favor. 22
The court in Mann was faced with numerous defenses, many similar to
the ones set forth in Brookshire, which they rejected in upholding the
sufficiency of the indictment. In response to the defendant's contentions,
the court held that it was not necessary for the indictment to allege that
the bank had suffered any loss due to the action of the defendant.2 Also,
the government need not have alleged that the misappropriated funds were
converted to the use of the defendants, 4 nor was it necessary for the gov15. 514 F.2d at 788, citing United States v. Cooper, 464 F.2d 648, 652-53 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107, 93 S.Ct. 901, 34 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973).
16. 514 F.2d at 788, citing United States v. Archarnbault, 441 F.2d 281, 283.
17. 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
18. 514 F.2d at 789, citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d
446, 453 (1961).
19. 514 F.2d at 789.
20. Id.
21. 496 F.2d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1974).
22. 514 F.2d at 790.
23. 517 F.2d at 268, citing United States v. Richert, 459 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1972).
24. 517 F.2d at 268, citing United States v. Fortunato, 402 F.2d 79, 82 (2nd Cir.), cert.
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ernment to allege that the misapplication was without the knowledge and
consent of the board of directors of the Waco bank."2
In addition to the defenses that went to the sufficiency of the indictment,
the defendant set forth several constitutional defenses which also did not
sway the court in upholding the indictment. The defendants argued that
the double jeopardy clause prohibited the government's appeal. Their
basis for this contention was United States v. Lewis,"6 where the district
court's dismissal of an indictment after an evidentiary hearing but before
trial was subsequently upheld by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court,
however, has vacated the decision in Lewis27 and remanded the case for
28
consideration in light of the Court's decision in Serfass v. United States,
which reiterated the principle that jeopardy does not attach until the
defendant is "put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a
jury or a judge. 2' 9 In addition to the double jeopardy defense, the defendants contended that the ex post facto clause barred the prosecution in this
case. They argued that their activities prior to the promulgation of Banking Circular No. 31 were not considered illegal, and that to hold them as
such, at this point, would be unconstitutional. The flaw in that argument,
however, was that Banking Circular No. 31 was not the point at which the
defendant's prior activities became illegal. 18 U.S.C.A. §656 and its penalty long predated the defendant's prosecution, and it is upon this statute
that the government based its case. The defendants next contended that
the prosecution should be prohibited because it was an ex post facto application of criminal sanctions and an unlawful retroactive application of
government policy. They contended that there had been no prosecutions
of the present nature or specific warning that the conduct under scrutiny
in this case was deemed to be criminal prior to the issuance of Banking
Circular No. 31. This defense was based on the rationale set forth in Raley
v. Ohio,30 which prohibited prosecution of a citizen for exercising a privilege that the state had indicated was available to him, and also, prohibited
prosecution if the government's conduct had "actively misled" the person
in order to prosecute. In addition to Raley, the defendants relied on United
States v. Laub,3 ' which held that "citizens may not be punished for actions
undertaken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurance that punishment will not attach."3 2 Thus, in order for the defendants to invoke the
Raley-Laub rationale, they had to prove that there had been a widespread
denied, 394 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 1205, 22 L.Ed.2d 463 (1969).
25. 517 F.2d at 268, citing United States v. Klock, 210 F.2d 217, 220 (2nd Cir. 1954).
26. 492 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. 421 U.S. 943, 95 S.Ct. 1671, 44 L.Ed.2d 97 (1975).
28. 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975).
29. 517 F.2d at 266, quoting 420 U.S. at 391, 95 S.Ct. at 1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 275 (1975).
30. 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959).
31. 385 U.S. 475, 87 S.Ct. 574, 17 L.Ed.2d 526 (1967).
32. 385 U.S. at 487, 87 S Ct. at 581, 17 L.Ed.2d 534 (1967).
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practice of entering into preferential loans of the kind involved in this case,
along with an absence of prior prosecutions or some authoritative assurance on behalf of the government that punishment would not attach. In a
trial on the merits, the defendants may be able to prove that there had
been a widespread practice of entering into loans of the kind involved in
this case, however, they will have difficulty proving an absence of prior
prosecutions as well as silence on behalf of the government. In this regard,
one last fact of the case remains. It was undisputed by the parties that the
loans in this case were renewed four times following the issuance of Banking Circular No. 31. The defendants may well have been misled prior to
the issuance of the circular, but they certainly could not have been misled
afterwards. In fact, inconsistencies in the defendant's pleadings admitted
to this fact. Defendants next contended that the indictment should have
been dismissed because they had been unfairly singled out for prosecution.
They claimed a denial of equal protection of the law, allegedly due to the
fact that the loan practice was widespread and others who engaged in
similar activities were not being punished. The Mann court indicated that
the judiciary should not interfere with the free exercise of discretion of the
attorneys of the United States, since it is the perogative of the executive,
and not the judiciary, to initiate criminal proceedings." The final defense
relied upon was that the prosecution contravened the public policy of the
United States by attempting to regulate private business through criminal
prosecutions. In answer to this argument the court stated that "public
policy favors the unencumbered enforcement of criminal laws . . .,31
The court's reasoning and ruling in Mann is clear. The maintenance of
a compensating balance in return for a preferential interest rate loan is now
an indictable offense under 18 U.S.C.A. §656. Although the court did not
reach a decision on the merits, a quote from Brookshire may have already
forecasted the outcome:
If, as defendant says, this practice is the usual way in which bankers
do business, those who engage in it must suffer the penalty which the law
constitutionally provides."
MICHAEL

A.

MCKENZIE

33. 517 F.2d at 271, citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965).
34. 517 F.2d at 271, quoting United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 693 (2nd
Cir. 1966).
35. 514 F.2d at 790.

